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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN FINANCE CO., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 19291 
THE STATE OF UTAH, THE STATE 
TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, and 
JOHN DOES 1 th rough 25, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves Chapter 30 of Title 63, the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson ruled that "the issuance of 
Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title falls into the category of 
governmental functions.• Be further ruled that the acts of 
defendants •are specifically not waived under Section 63-30-10 
(3) and (6), Utah Code Ann., 1953." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants State of Utah and the State Tax Commission 
request that the Order of the District Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State Tax Commission, through the Motor VehicJ, 
Division, issued a clear title on the 1974 Rolls Royce on 
November 15, 1974, to Kenneth Melby. On May 8, 1975, a 
duplicate title was issued to Melby. 
Stephen J. Gibbs was issued a new title on June 15, 
1978, upon surrender of the original title. This new title 
showed Metropolitan Finance as a lien holder. 
Metropolitan Finance obtained a Judgment of 
Foreclosure and Order of Sale against Stephen J. Gibbs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUANCE OF TITLE CERTIFICATES IS AN 
EXERCISE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. 
Standiford y. Salt Lake City 605 P.2d 1230, 
outlines the criteria essential for governmental immunity under 
Section 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity Act. That section 
provides that "all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of 
goyernmental function .•. • 
Standiford defined a governmental function as an 
activity "of such a unique nature that it can only be perforroea 
by a governmental agency.• A possible enlargement of that 
definition was made in Madsen y. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627. 
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The Utah Motor Vehicle Act, Chapter 1 of Title 41, 
Utal1 Code Ann·, provides for the Motor Vehicle Division of the 
rrtah Tax Commission to administer, regulate and issue motor 
vehicle registrations and titles. In Utah, as in all other 
states, this activity is completely administered and operated 
by the state government to facilitate law enforcement and 
related activities. The issuing of motor vehicle titles is "of 
such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a 
governmental agency." 
POINT II 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS NOT WAIVED UNDER 
63-30-10 (c) AND (f). 
As the injury "allegedly" suffered by the plaintiff 
resulted from the "exercise for governmental function" under 
Section 63-30-3 the state is immune unless immunity is 
expressly waived in other sections of the Iimnunity Act. 
Plaintiff bases his action on the purported negligence of the 
State Tax Commission (Motor Vehicle Division). It is true that 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 generally waives governmental immunity 
for injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of 
governmental employees; however, that section specifically 
preservee immunity as to certain activities, including those 
where the alleged injury: 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension or revocation of, or by the failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, 
order, or similar authorization, or • • • • 
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(fl arises out of a misrepresentation by said 
employee whether or not such is negligent or 
intentional. •• 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that Utah Code AM. 
63-30-lO(f} provides complete immunity from suit to a 
governmental entity for the negligent misrepresentation of ar, 
employee, even where a plaintiff has suffered pecuniary loss in 
reliance upon the misrepresentation. In Rapp y, Salt Lake 
.ciU• 527 P.2d 651 <Utah 1974), the plaintiff sued to recover 
the expense he incurred in preparing a bid for a construction 
project, where the City's invitation for bids failed to 
disclose that a competitive advantage had already been granted 
to a third party and that the bidding was not truly 
competitive. The Court found that the plaintiff's action was' 
tort action, alleging deceit, and cited Utah Code Ann. 63-30-J, 
10(2) and 10(6) in holding that the trial court properly 
granted the city's motion for summary judgment. Also, an 
action against the State for the alleged misrepresentation of 
an employee as to the status of plaintiff's access after 
highway improvement was dismissed in Boyce y. State, 26 Utah 
2d 138, 486 P.2d 387 <1971). 
Defendant is not aware of other Utah case law which 
construes Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (3) and (6), ((cl and (fl in 
pocket However, it is highly instructive to look 
to decisions by California courts construing statutes 
substantially identical to the Utah sections where pecuniary 
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ln•s has been alleged due to the issuance of an incorrect 
or to a negligent misrepresentation by a public 
Pmployee. The California statutes were enacted in 1963, two 
years before the enactment of the Utah states. 1 
In Brown y. City of Los Angeles, 267 Cal.App. 849, 
73 Cal.Rptr. 364 Cl968J, plaintiff, the erstwhile operator of a 
therapeutic massage parlor and income tax service, sued for 
damages incurred in closing her business after being notified 
by the city that her business violated local zoning and being 
misinformed by city personnel that no zoning variance had been 
granted. The Court found that the erroneous notification 
1
section 818.4 of the California Government Code states: 
A public entity is not liable for an injury 
caused by the issuance. denial. suspension or 
reyocation of, or by the failure or refusal to 
issue. deny. suspend or reyoke. any permit. 
license certificate. approyal. order. or similar 
authorization where the public entity or an 
employee of the public entity is authorized by 
enactment to determine whether or not such 
authorization should be issued, denied, 
suspended or revoked. 
Section 818.8 of the California Government Code states: 
A public entity is not liable for an injury 
caused by misrepresentation by an employee 
of the public entity, whether or not such 
misrepresentation be negligent or intentional. 
The language emphasized is contained verbatim in Utah Code Ann. 
63-30-10 CcJ and Cf), respectively. 
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amounted to a misrepresentation within the meaning of sectic:. 
818.8 and on the basis of that section, 818.4, and other 
sections of of the Governmental Code, held that such a 
misrepresentation could not be the basis for public liabilit\. 
And in a case almost exactly on point the innocent 
purchaser of a stolen automobile brought an action against th; 
California Department of Motor Vehicles because its personnel 
had negligently issued a certificate of title to the thief, anc 
had failed to require the filing of a bond, Hirsch y. People, 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 42 Cal.App.3d 352, 115 Cal.Rptr. 
452 (1972). The court ruled that in light of California's 
specific statutory reference to "certificates• of automobile 
ownership, such certificates were within the meaning of sect1or, 
Bl 8. 4, which imrnun ized the State for the issuance of "any . , 
certificate" (see footnote 1 and Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (3)). 
The Court held that the erroneous certificate of title 
constitutes a "misrepresentation:" under section 818.8, and 
"defendant would be entitled to immunity under that section 
alone.• at 455. The Court affirmed the lower court's 
dismissal of the action. 
Similarly, in Schonfeld y. City of Valleio, 50 
Cal.App.3d 401, 123 Cal.Rptr. 669 <1975), dismissal of an 
action against the city because it was immune under the 
"misrepresentation• section, 818.B, was affirmed. There, the 
plaintiff alleged that the city manager's misrepresentations 
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wrongfully induced him to do development work on a marina which 
he would not have done absent the misrepresentation. 
In Grenell y. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal.App.3d 
864, 163 Cal.Rptr. 315 (1980), the purchasers of real property 
sued the sellers and the city for damages, where city employees 
had negligently misstated the content of city records by 
representing that local zoning law would allow two dwelling 
units on the property. The sellers also cross-claimed against 
the city, on the basis that, at the time of the sellers' 
earlier purchase of the property, a similar negligent 
misstatement of the records had been made by city personnel. 
The trial court dismissed the cross-complaint, and the 
appellate court affirmed, on the basis that section 818.8 
provided the city with absolute immunity from liability for the 
negligent misrepresentation alleged. 
New Jersey has similar statutes providing that a 
'public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the 
issuance . of • any permit, license, certificate. 
New Jersey statutes Ann. 59:2-5 and that a public entity is not 
liable for the "misrepresentation• of its employee, N.J.S.A. 
59:2-2(b), 3-10. In Mallory y, State, 76 N.J. 515, 388 A.2d 
622 (1978), suit was brought against the state real estate 
licensing body for its erroneous notification to plaintiff that 
he bad failed the licensing examination. The Court found that 
the 'licensing• statute cited above granted a "pervasive• 
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immunity to "all phases of the licensing function," .!.Ji.. at 
625, and, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider the 
applicability of the "misrepresentation" section. 
Finally, the Federal Tort Claims Act has a section 
which preserves governmental immunity for "any claim arising 
out of ••• misrepresentation ••• •, 28 u.s.c. 2680(hl. n,, 
section has been described as analogous to section 818.8 of 
California Government Code, Johnson y. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 
447 P.2d 352 Cl96 8), and must be deemed as analogous also to 
the very similar Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 (f). The 
Utah Supreme Court has previously looked to the judicial 
interpretations of provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act as 
an aid in construing similar provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, e.g., Franky. State, 613 P.2d 
517, 519 !1980). 
In United States y. Neystadt, 366 U.S. 696, 81 
s.ct. 1294 C1961), the Supreme Court held as a matter of law 
that the purchaser of a home who was induced by a 
performed FHA appraisal to pay in excess of fair market value 
could not recover damages against the government. Pursuant to 
12 u.s.c. 1715q, a section of the National Housing Act, the 
seller had delivered to the buyer an official FHA document, 
setting forth a statement of the FHA-appraised value. The 
Court held that this negligent misrepresentation was 
comprehended by 28 u.s.c. 2680Chl, and the action was 
-8- ... 
dismissed. The Court cited with approval, inter alia, .lla.U. 
'i· United States, 274 F.2d 69 ClOth Cir. 1959), where the 
rourt of Appeals held that plaintiff could not recover where, 
relying on a negligent report by Department of Agriculture 
agents that his cattle were diseased, he had sold them at less 
than fair value. 
A factual comparison of the Utah, California, New 
Jersey and federal cases cited above with the instant case 
clearly demonstrates that this action must be dismissed. In 
each of the cited cases, as in the present action, plaintiffs 
alleged that they had suffered a pecuniary loss through 
reliance on a negligently issued certificate or license, or on 
a misrepresentation of fact by a governmental agency. Each 
action was dismissed as a matter of law, on the basis either of 
a statute providing immunity for negligent misrepresentations 
(EiU2!1, Schonfeld, Grenell, Neustadt, and ll.all cases), 
or a statute providing immunity for the issuance of a 
certificate or license (Mallory easel, or both statutes 
and cases). 
In both the and Neustadt cases, 
governmental agencies which were directed by statute to issue 
informational statements or certific.ates did so, erroneously 
and negligently; in each case, a third party conveyed the 
!!\accurate information to the plaintiff, who, in reliance on 
1+, suffered pecuniary damage. The instant case is in exactly 
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the same posture -- it is alleged that the State Tax Commiss. 
charged by statute with the issuance of certificates of title 
!see Chapter 1 of Title 41, Utah Code Ann.) negligently issue. 
a duplicate certificate of title and plaintiff subsequently 
suffered a pecuniary loss through reliance upon the erroneou' 
certificate. Both the and Neustadt cases were 
dismissed under statutes substantially the same as Utah Code 
Ann. 63-30-10(6). The defendant, State of Utah, in this actic'. 
is clearly granted immunity from suit, and the matter must be 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Chapter 1 of Title 41, th' 
State Tax Commission, Motor Vehicle Division issued a 
"certificate" of title. Plaintiff claims that the certificate 
misrepresented the true record, and that plaintiff suffered a 
financial loss in reliance on the negligent misrepresentation. 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-lO(c) and (f) expressly preserve 
governmental immunity for damages arising from the issuance of 
any certificate or from a negligent misrepresentation. Both 
the unambiguous statutory language and the case law construinq 
these and nearly identical statutes in other jurisdictions 
require that this action be dismissed. 
DATED this 
-- - - ---------------
FRANK . ELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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